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ANTITRUST LIABILITY PREMISED
Edward D. Cavanagh*
On Enforcement of Invalid Intellectual Property Rights
This article will explore potential antitrust liability arising from attempted
enforcement of invalid patents or trade secrets known to be invalid. A
fundamental tension exists between the law of intellectual property and
antitrust law. Federal patent' laws and the state law doctrines of trade secrets2
confer on the holder exclusive rights to exploit an invention or creation and
to exclude others from its use. The rationale of the patent laws and state
intellectual property laws is to foster innovation and to provide inventors with
protection for the fruits of their labor.' By contrast, antitrust laws4 embody a
public policy favoring free competition and generally discourage exclusionary
behavior by an entity. Antitrust laws rest upon the premise that the
"unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our political and social institutions."5 An
uneasy equilibrium exists between intellectual property law and antitrust law.
As long as the intellectual property laws are used as a shield to protect the
holder's property rights, antitrust concerns must yield. However, when
intellectual property rights are used as a sword to destroy competition,
antitrust concerns prevail and the holders may face antitrust liability if they
have accumulated sufficient presence in the particular market.6
Courts have recognized the following two theories of antitrust liability
arising from the assertion of invalid intellectual property rights:
(1) enforcement of a patent obtained by committing fraud on the patent office7
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35 U.S.C. § 1 (1996).
See generally, Roger M. Milgram, TRADE SECRETS (1997).
3
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,486 (1974); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon
Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985), cert denied,474 U.S. 1016 (1986).
4
15 U.S.C. § 1(1995).
5
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
7
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
2
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and (2) knowing enforcement or threats of enforcement of invalid patents' or
trade secrets.9 The first category, acquisition of the patent monopoly by
fraudulent means, is unquestionably a serious matter but, as discussed below, 0
there have been relatively few antitrust prosecutions premised on this theory.
The second category, attempted enforcement of invalid patents or trade secrets
known to be invalid, is equally antithetical to competition but may prove even
more insidious than fraud on the patent office. Whereas one who fraudulently
obtains a patent is acting unlawfully ab initio,those enforcing invalid patents
have frequently acted lawfully in obtaining patent rights and enforcing those
rights. Liability in the second category may be based upon either bad faith
enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights or upon enforcement of
invalid intellectual property rights as part of an overall scheme to monopolize.
In examining "bad faith" intellectual property claims, the courts have
attempted to balance the public interest in free competition with the inventor's
interest in enforcing its intellectual property rights and the First Amendment
interest in free access to the courts to protect those rights." The problems
arise when the patent holder, whose market position has become entrenched
by virtue of the patent, seeks to extend the patent monopoly beyond its lawful
period by using the courts to enforce expired or unfounded intellectual
property claims. These issues have recently arisen in the flat glass industry,
dominated by the British giant, Pilkington, which has spawned a government
enforcement action12 and several private suits. 3
Although the "bad faith theory" may nominally increase the number of
antitrust prosecutions, plaintiffs generally have not fared well. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recently made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on
this theory of recovery.' 4 This article will analyze the legal theories applicable
to antitrust liability and explore the practical problems that must be overcome
in. order to have a successful prosecution of an antitrust case premised on
enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights.

8 Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026
(1980); Kobe Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.1952), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 837 (1952).
CVD, Inc., 769 F.2d at 850-51.
10
See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
I
See, e.g., Walker Process Equip. Inc., 382 U.S. at 177-78; CVD, Inc., 769 F.2d at 849;
Handgards,Inc., 601 F.2d at 993-96; Kobe, Inc., 198 F.2d at 424-25.
12
United States v. Pilkington, CIV. A. No. CV 94-345, 1994 WL 750645 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 1994).
13
See, e.g., PPG Industries, Inc. v. Pilkington, 825 F.Supp. 1465 (D. Ariz. 1993).
14
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
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I.
A.

Fraud on the Patent Office

Walker Process Theory

In Walker Process Equipipment., Inc. v. Food Machinery& Chemical
Corp.," the Supreme Court held that "the enforcement of a patent procured by
fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act
16
provided the other elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.
In Walker Process, the patentee, Food Machinery, commenced an
infringement action against defendant Walker Process, which not only denied
infringement but also interposed a counterclaim in seeking a declaratory
judgment stating that Walker Process' patent was invalid. 7 Thereafter, the
patentee sought voluntarily to dismiss its action because the patent had
expired, but Walker Process amended its counterclaim to allege that Food
Machinery had violated § 2 of the Sherman Act because it had knowingly and
willfully misrepresented facts material to its patent application to the patent
office and had subsequently attempted to enforce the fraudulently procured
patent.1" The trial court dismissed the antitrust counterclaim and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 9 The Supreme Court, however, reversed and reinstated the
antitrust claim, noting that its recognition of antitrust liability premised on
fraudulent procurement of a patent was consistent with a prior cases allowing
alleged infringers to challenge the validity of a patent based on patent misuse.
The Court stated:
To permit recovery of treble damages for the fraudulent procurement
of the patent coupled with violations of § 2 accords with these longrecognized procedures. It would also promote the purposes so well
expressed in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automative
Maintenance Machinery Corp., 324 U.S. 806, 816, 65 S.Ct. 993, 999,
89 L. Ed. 1381, 1387 (1945)], 324 U.S. at 816, 89 L. Ed. at 1387 (full
citation added).

5

Walker ProcessEquip. Inc., 382 U.S. at 179.

16

Id. at 174.

"

Id. at 173-74.

is

Id. at 174.

19

Id.

BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest.... 'It'
is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right
to access to a free and open market. The far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a
paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from
backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.'
The court emphasized that antitrust liability would attach only to those
patents "procured by intentionalfraud."2 (emphasis added).
Walker's counterclaim alleged that Food Machinery obtained the
patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent
Office. Proof of this assertion would be sufficient to strip Food
Machinery of its exemption from the antitrust laws. By the same
token, Food Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete
defense. This includes an honest mistake as to the effect of prior
installation upon patentability-so called "technical fraud."'2 2
In his concurrence, Justice Harlan elaborated on the legal standard for
determining fraudulent procurement:
We hold today that a treble-damage action for monopolization which,
but for the existence of a patent, would be violative of § 2 of the
Sherman Act may be maintained under § 4 of the Clayton Act if two
conditions are satisfied: (1) the relevant patent is shown to have been
procured by knowing and willful fraud practiced by the defendant on
the Patent Office, or, if the defendant was not the original patent
applicant, he had been enforcing the patent with knowledge of the
fraudulent manner in which it was obtained; and (2) all the elements
otherwise necessary to establish a § 2 monopolization charges are
proved. Conversely, such a private cause of action would not be
made out if the plaintiff: (1) showed no more than invalidity of the
patent arising, for example, from a judicial finding of "obviousness,"
or from other factors sometimes compendiously referred to as

2

2
22

Id. at 176-77.
Jd. at 176
Id. At 177.
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"technical fraud"; or (2) showed fraudulent procurement, but no
knowledge thereof by the defendant; or (3) failed to prove the
elements of a § 2 charge....23
Proof of knowing and willful fraud is essential to establishing antitrust
liability. Inadvertent or honest mistakes will not suffice to establish the
requisite mens rea. Moreover, neither recklessness nor gross negligence will
meet the knowing and willful standard.' The mere withholding from the
patent office, without more, of sufficient information to sustain an antitrust
claim will not meet the standard but this conduct may be sufficiently
inequitable to render the patent unenforceable.2" The antitrust plaintiff must
present clear and convincing proof of actual deception perpetrated against the
patent office.
In addition, plaintiff must also establish the elements of an offense under
section 2 of the Sherman Act.26 To prove a monopoly, plaintiff must show:
1. The existence of monopoly power, that is, the power to control price
or to exclude competition, and
2. The wilful acquisition and maintenance of that market power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen or historic accident."
Alternatively, plaintiff could prove the offense
monopolization by establishing the following elements:

of attempted

1. specific intent to monopolize, i.e., to control price and to destroy
competition in a relevant market;

d. at 179.
Argus Chem. Corp. v. FibreGlass - Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1987), (citing
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (with respect to the
attempt-to-monopolize counterclaim based on fraud, the court emphasized that specific intent, greater than
an intent evidenced by gross negligence or recklessness, is an indispensable element).
23
24

25
Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (the
quantum of proof required to establish inequitable conduct sufficient to render a patent unenforceable is
less than the level of proof necessary to establish intentional fraud as required under Walker Process
because "in the former instance a party raises a shield and in the latter instance a party unsheathes a

sword").
2

Walker Process Equip. Inc., 382 U.S. at 177.
United States v. Grinnell Corp. 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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2. predatory or anticompetitive acts designed to achieve an unlawful
objective; and
3. a dangerous probability of achieving success in a relevant market.28
B. Walker Process in the Courts
Walker Process represents a significant step in the evolutionary
development of patent/antitrust law. Courts had always recognized that fraud
on the patent office would constitute inequitable conduct that would foreclose
enforcement of the patent. Walker Processtakes this doctrine one step further
and raises the stakes for the holder of a fraudulently procured patent who
attempts to enforce that patent by exposing the holder to potential treble
damage liability. Whereas the inequitable conduct doctrine allows fraud to
be used as a shield to prevent enforcement, Walker Process provides the
sword of treble damages liability to be used against the holder.
One might have expected that Walker Process would fuel a growth
industry in patent/antitrust litigation but it has not. Surprisingly, there have
been relatively few Walker Processcases29 and even fewer successful Walker
Process prosecutions.30 This is largely because proof of fraud on the patent
office is itself a formidable undertaking. As discussed, plaintiff must prove
intentional fraud involving affirmative dishonesty by clear and convincing
evidence. That is, plaintiff must prove a well-hatched plot specifically
intended to defraud the United States patent office. Added to that burden is
the onus of establishing monopolization or attempted monopolization, and as
a result, a successful Walker Processprosecution becomes a Herculean task.
The difficulties in proving a Walker Process case are perhaps best
illustrated by the Tetracycline Cases.3 These cases arose out of a series of

2

29

Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993).
See, e.g,. Al-Site Corp v. Opti-Ray, Inc., 28 USPQ (BNA) 1058 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 1993);

Import Sys. Int'l Inc. v. Lee, No. 90 CIV 6896, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3439, (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 20, 1992);
Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-40 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Argus Chem.
Corp. v. Fibre Glass Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,472 U.S. 1018 (1975); Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620
F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacoon Inc., 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir.
1977); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings In Antibiotics Antitrust Litigation, 498 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1982).
30
See, e.g., Arcade Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578 (July 2,
1991).
31
In re Antibiotics Antitrust litigation, 448 F. Supp. at 35.
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congressional hearings32 in 1959 and 1960 into pricing behavior in the
prescription drug industry and focused specifically on the manufacturers of
broad spectrum antibiotics. Penicillin, discovered in 1929 and tested in the
1930's, was introduced commercially during World War II as the first
antibiotic. It became known as the "wonder drug" because its antibacterial
properties and potential life-saving qualities. Penicillin, however, was
effective against only a narrow range of bacterial infections.3 3 Researchers
quickly realized the potential financial rewards for developing similar drugs
with broader spectra of antibacterial activity, which led to a post-war race to
discover additional "wonder drugs." Lederle Laboratories, a division of
American Cyanamid, Company developed the first broad spectrum antibiotic,
chlortetracycline, known universally by its brand-name, Aureomycin. 3'
Aureomycin was an instant success and its success fueled additional efforts
by Lederle and its rivals to develop similar drugs.35 Researchers were
especially interested in finding a drug with Aureomycin's antibacterial
properties but without the undesirable side effects.36
At about the same time, scientists from Lederle and rival Pfizer removed
chloretrachycline's chlorine atom and replaced it with a hydrogen atom-a
process known as "dechlorination." Both companies filed a pattent
application for the new drug, tetracycline. The patent office declared an
interference, and both sides exchanged proof of priority. 3' Lederle and Pfizer
also agreed that the party who obtained the patent would grant a license to the
other party. Subsequently, Lederle conceded priority to Pfizer.38
The patent examiner initially rejected the patent claims on the tetracycline
for lack of novelty because he concluded that tetracycline was inherently a coproduced with Aureomycin and required additional experiments to prove or
disprove the basis of his rejection.39 Pfizer's attorneys thereafter prepared a
memorandum which concluded that the patent examiner's rejection was based
on the erroneous presumption that substantial portions of tetracycline had

32

Senator Kefauver's Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly issued a comprehensive report

on May 8, 1961. SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY.
STUDY OF ADMINISTRFD PRICES IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY, S. REP. No. 448, 87TH, 1ST SESS. (1961).

35

In re Antibiotics Antitrust itigation, 498 F. Supp. at 30.
Id.
Id. (Pfizer Inc. introduced oxytetracycline under the brand name Terramycin).

36

Id.

37

Id.
Id. at31.
Id.

33
34

38
39
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been produced by the Aureomycin process when, in fact, "mere unrecognized
trace amounts serving no useful purpose" were all that resulted.' The Pfizer
memorandum served as the basis of a subsequent presentation to the patent
examiner.4 After that meeting, Pfizer amended its patent application to
reflect its view of the results of that meeting.42 Thereafter, the patent
examiner withdrew his prior rejection, and issued the patent to Pfizer.43
Subsequently, Pfizer licensed Lederle to make, use and sell tetracycline.'
In 1969, some 14 years after the patent on tetracycline issued and
following an FTC enforcement
action and a failed criminal antitrust
prosecution,' the United States commenced a civil action seeking:
(1) cancellation of the patent on the grounds of fraudulent procurement;
(2) money damages for common law deceit; and (3) treble damages on Walker
Process and price-fixing theories.' The government claimed that tetracycline
was not patentable because it lacked novelty. The government argued that
tetracycline was co-produced" by the process that produced chlortetracycline
and that representatives of Pfizer had knowingly misled the patent examiner
with respect to co-production.4 9 Defendants acknowledged that in test batches
some tetracycline had appeared in the process of making chlortetracycline but
that tetracycline appeared in trace amounts not recoverable by standard
techniques and hence was insignificant and not a bar to patentability. 0
When the case finally came to trial in 1978, the government attempted to
focus the trial judge on the question of what the patent examiner wanted to
know and what he was told by the defendants. The government claimed that:
(1) the patent examiner would have been interested in knowing about "any
amount" of tetracycline produced by prior processes for making
chlortetracycline and not simply in "'substantial"' amounts; (2) Pfizer knew
that the patent examiner was interested in whether any amounts of tetracycline
had been produced by prior processes for making chlortetracycline; and
40

Id.

41

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.

42
43

Id.
IId.

45

Charles. Pfizer & Co. Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968).

United States v. Charles Pfizer & Co. Inc., 426 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1970), affd per curiam, 404
U.S. 548 (1972).
47
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings In Antibiotic Antitrust Action, 448 F. Supp. at 29-30.
48
Id at 31-32.
46

49

Id.

so

Id. at35.
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(3) Pfizer had acted fraudulently in not telling the patent examiner that its
affidavit tests and prior research had indicated tetracycline co-production
under the prior processes. Pfizer countered that its representatives had
responded to the patent examiner candidly and furnished the requested data."
Stressing that the government had failed to carry its heavy burden of
"specific fraudulent intent and not mere "'technical fraud,"' the court rejected
the fraud on the patent office theory.
The law is clear that to establish fraud on the Patent Office a specific
fraudulent intent must be shown; good faith is a complete defense and
a mere "technical fraud" or honest mistake will not suffice. Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177, 88 S.Ct. 347, 350, 15 L. Ed.2d 247 (1965); Bendix Corp. v.
Balax, Inc., 421 F.2d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
911, 90 S. Ct. 2203, 26 L. Ed.2d 562 (1970). The government had the
burden to prove that Murphy and Hutz not only withheld or misstated
material information, but that they did so with the specific intent to
defraud the Patent Office. The government has failed to prove the
fraudulent intent.52
While fraud on the Patent Office is an appealing theory of antitrust
liability in the abstract, the reality is that Walker Processcases are inherently
complex, costly to litigate and thus are risky ventures. Not surprisingly,
antitrust plaintiffs have found success elusive.
H. ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
KNOWN TO BE INVALID
The federal courts in general and the Ninth Circuit in particular have held
that antitrust liability may be premised on (1) bad faith lawsuits or threats of
lawsuits to enforce invalid intellectual property rights pursued with the intent
to monopolize a certain industry,5 3 and (2) commencement of infringement

SI

Id. at 31-34.

52

Id. at 35.

Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 1025
(1980); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Grid Sys.
Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Conceptual Eng'g Assoc., Inc.
v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262, 1267 (D.R.L 1989).
53
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suits and trade secret actions as part of an overall scheme to monopolize.54
This conduct constitutes an antitrust violation only if the other elements of a
monopolization or attempted monopolization offense are demonstrated.55
The courts have had little difficulty recognizing attempted enforcement
of invalid intellectual property as a basis of antitrust liability. However, the
courts have had some difficulty in identifying the criteria for determining
when an enforcement action is sufficiently lacking in merit so as to trigger
antitrust concerns. 56 This difficulty is rooted in the basic tension between
patent law and antitrust law. Congress, by enacting the patent laws gave the
patentee the right to exclude others from exploiting the invention for a period
of seventeen years.57 The antitrust laws, on the other hand, are concerned with
proscribing various kinds of market power." When the patented product is
only one of many products that actively competes, there is little conflict
between the patent owner's property rights and antitrust laws. However, when
the patented product is so successful as to create its own economic market or
consumes a large section of an existing market, the aims of the patent laws and
the antitrust laws may seem at odds.59 A fine line exists between protecting
a patent holder's legitimate interests and promoting free and unfettered
competition under the antitrust laws. 60 The fact that a patent is obtained does
not wholly insulate the patentee from potential antitrust liability in attempted
exploitation and enforcement of asserted patent rights. 6'
54
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
837 (1952); Handgards, 601 F.2d at 990; Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Harco Products Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1000
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 831 (1975); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d
710, 715 (9th Cir. 1968); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963); see generally, United
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949), afd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
55
Grid Sys. Corp., 771 F. Supp. at 1041; PH.P E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNERl,
ANTrrRUST
LAW, 1 708' n.1 (1994 Supp.).
5
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 55 at 708; Stephen A. Stack Jr., Recent and Impending
Developments in Copyright and Antitrust, 61 ANTrrRusT L. J. 331,342 (1993).
57
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1996); Atari Games Corp., 897 F.2d at 1576.
59
Handgards Inc., 601 F.2d at 992.
59
Atari Games Corp., 897 F.2d at 1576.

60
61

Id.

The Court stated:
When a patent owner uses his patent rights not only as a shield to protect his invention, but
as a sword to eviscerate competition unfairly, that owner may be found to have abused the
grant and may become liable for antitrust violations when sufficient power in the relevant
market is present Therefore, patent owners may incur antitrust liability for enforcement of
a patent known to be obtained through fraud or known to be invalid, where license of a
patent compels the purchase of unpatented goods, or where there is an overall scheme to

ANTITRUST LIABILITY PREMISED
At the same time, mere commencement of an infringement suit, even if
ultimately unsuccessful, cannot solely give rise to an antitrust violation.
Congress specifically granted patentees the right to sue to protect their
inventions.62 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Handgards,"[p]atentees
must be permitted to test the validity of their patents in court through actions
against alleged infringers. 63 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc." and its
progeny 65 has held that the use of the courts to enforce legal rights cannot
violate the antitrust laws, unless the court action is a sham disguised as an
anticompetitive scheme to restrain trade.66
A.

Bad Faith Infringement Suits

Attempts to enforce patents known to be invalid or to protect trade secrets
known to be in the public domain may violate section 2 of the Sherman Act.61
In Handgards,the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Ethicon, had attempted
to monopolize the market for heat-sealed plastic gloves. 68 Handgards
contended that Ethicon had violated the antitrust laws by commencing and
prosecuting a series of patent infringement actions in bad faith because of its
knowledge that the underlying patent was invalid.69 Specifically, Handgards
alleged, and the jury found, that (1) the patent was invalid based on prior
invention; (2) the patent was invalid because the gloves had been "on sale" or
"in prior use" for more than a year prior to the filing of the patent application;
and (3) the patent was invalid because of prior public use by an earlier
inventor.70 Handgards argued that Ethicon had generated adverse publicity
regarding its infringement actions, threatening potential Handgards' customers
and forcing vital corporate resources to be diverted to the defense of

62
63
6

65
67

use the patent to violate antitrust laws. [footnotes omitted]. (emphasis added). Id. at 157677.
35 U.S.C. § 15 (1996).
HandgardsInc., 601 F.2d at 993.
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Id. at 510-11.
Handgards,Inc., 601 F.2d at 990 (patents); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (1 st Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986) (trade secrets).
69
Handgards,Inc., 601 F.2d at 989.
69
Id. at 989-90.
70
HandgardsInc. 1,601 F.2d at 990-91; HandgardsInc. Il,
743 F.2d at 1290-92.
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infringement actions.7 As a result, Handgards' relations with potential
customers were impaired, a proposed joint venture was aborted, and the
company was unable to obtain outside financing necessary to remain
competitive in the field.72
Most recently, the Antitrust Division utilized a Handgards theory to
prosecute Pilkington, the giant British glassmaker. The Division filed a
complaint and competitive impact statement that stated the following: in the
late 1950's, Pilkington pioneered a successgul commercial float process for
manufacturing flat glass73 ; Pilkington secured hundreds of patents throughout
the world on its float process which replaced both the sheet and plate
processes as the technology of choice74 ; in the early 1960's, Pilkington began
to enter into patent and know-how licensing arrangements with its major
rivals75 ; and over 90% of the world's flat glass is manufactured pursuant to
Pilkington licenses.76
The Pilkington licenses allegedly imposed restraints on exports, and
imposed territorial and other use restrictions which limited the countries
where the licensed patents and know-how could be used.77 The licensees also
allegedly imposed confidentiality and non-disclosure obligations covering all
disclosed know-how, unless the information had become public knowledge.7"
The Antitrust Division alleged that Pilkington continued to enforce these
restrictive agreements, even though: (1) the underlying patents have expired;
(2) the know-how is now largely in the public domain; (3) the original float
licenses have terminated; and (4) the royalty obligations were fully paid.79
According to the Antitrust Division, the result of the restrictions, which
Pilkington has continued to enforce, is that existing licensees cannot design
and build new float plants or sublicense others to do so without Pilkington' s
permission.' The Antitrust Division also cited evidence that Pilkington made
efforts to coordinate activities of various licensees pursuant to a common goal
to limit entry of competing technologies."' The Consent Decree entered on
71

Handgards, Inc., 601 F.2d at 991.

n

Id.

73
74

59 Fed. Reg. 30604, 30608 (June 14, 1994).
Id. at 30609.

75

Id.

76

7
79

79

90
81

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 30604.
Id. at 30609-10.
Id. at 30610.
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December 22, 1994 ended these alleged anticompetitive practices by enjoining
enforcement of restrictive licensing agreements with respect to expired patents
and know-how in the public domain. 2 In addition, the Consent Decree should
clarify the rights of any private parties who may allege that any attempts to
enforce expired patents and know-how that are part of the public domain are
unlawful and exclusionary. 3
Handgards,by its terms, does not involve trade secrets; and, in theory,
"trade secrets need not enjoy the same solicitude as patent infringement
suits.""M Nevertheless, courts have generally applied the same principles in
trade secret cases as in patent cases.8 5 In CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,
Raytheon, a company specializing in commercial and military electronics,
alleged that former employees had misappropriated Raytheon trade secrets.8 6
Both companies manufactured zinc compounds by various processes, and
Raytheon claimed that the compounds could not be manufactured by these
processes without misappropriation of trade secrets. 7 Raytheon threatened
suit unless substantial royalties were paid. The former employees agreed but
paid no royalties. Applying the Handgards standards to trade secrets, the
court concluded that Raytheon, by prosecuting the trade secret actions, acted
in bad faith and violated the antitrust laws. 8 The record demonstrated that
Raytheon was not acting in good faith for the following reasons:
(1) Raytheon's processes were well-known in the scientific community
and had been published by Raytheon and its employees.
(2) A competent engineer, relying on published materials alone, could
have duplicated the processes.
(3) Raytheon's internal procedures for maintaining confidentiality, such
as by stamping documents, had not been applied in this case.
(4) Prior to threats of litigation, CVD had informed Raytheon that the
alleged secrets had been published in government reports.
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(5) Raytheon had threatened litigation "after only a cursory investigation
without thoroughly examining the majority of the government reports or the
extent of public disclosure." 9
Thus, the standards for antitrust claims based on intentional enforcement
of invalid. trade secrets are the same as the standards for parallel liability in
patent cases.
Elements of Bad Faith Infringement Claim
To establish an antitrust claim under section two of the Sherman Act
based on use of the courts to enforce an invalid patent under Handgards,
plaintiffs must prove:
(1) Clear and convincing evidence of actual knowledge that the patent in
question is invalid;
(2) Specific intent to monopolize the relevant market;
(3) Dangerous probability of success; and
(4) Antitrust damages clearly attributable to the patentee's enforcement
action.'
Proof that a patentee knowingly attempted to enforce an invalid patent is
not sufficient to establish antitrust liability. Plaintiff must, in addition, prove
the elements of a monopolization or attempted monopolization. 9
1. Actual Knowledge of Invalidity.
a. Clearand convincing evidence.
The first element of a Handgards claim requires the plaintiff to prove
defendant's bad faith in attempting to enforce a government granted monopoly
to which the holder knows it has no rights.' In establishing bad faith, it is not
enough for plaintiff to show that the patent is invalid but the plaintiff must

Id. at 853-54.
Conceptual Eng'g Assoc. v. Aelectronic Bonding Co., 714 F. Supp. 1262, 1266 (D.R.I. 1989);
see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1288 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1190
(1985) Grid Sys.Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1033, 1041 (D. N. Cal. 1991); DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENT LAW, § 17.05[3] (Supp.).
91
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show ex ante that the patentee knew the patent was invalid and attempted
nonetheless to enforce it.93
Mere attempts to enforce patents that ultimately are shown to be invalid
are not sufficient to trigger antitrust liability. As discussed above," the patent
laws entitle patentees to test the validity of their patents in court. The court
in Handgardsrecognized the serious dilemma faced by courts in determining
invalidity actions:
patentees must be permitted to test the validity of their patents in
court through actions against alleged infringers.... On the other hand,
infringement actions initiated and conducted in bad faith contribute
nothing to the furtherance of the policies of either the patent law or
95
the antitrust law.
The solution recognized by Handgards"is to provide the means whereby the
bad faith infringement action can be identified post hoc with a sufficiently
high degree of certainty to make it highly improbable that the action was
brought in good faith." 96 The court concluded that the proper course would
be "to erect barriers to antitrust suits as are necessary to provide reasonable
protection for the honest patentee who brings an infringement action."'97 The
barrier erected by Handgards is "that a patentee's infringement suit is
presumptively in good faith and that this presumption can be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence."98 (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit has attempted to balance the patent laws and the
antitrust laws by requiring an enhanced showing of wrongdoing in invalidity
cases. The court in Handgards considered and rejected a preponderance
standard in favor of a clear and convincing standard because it feared that a
mere preponderance standard might chill legitimate patent enforcement.9
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b. Noerrprotection
Patent enforcement suits enjoy protection from a second, unrelated legal
doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Noerr and its progeny. As will
be discussed below,"r° Noerr confers antitrust immunity on efforts to obtain
government action, even if those efforts spring from anticompetitive
motivations. In CaliforniaMotor TransportCo.,' 0 ' the Supreme Court made
clear that Noerr immunity extended to the litigation process, except where the
litigation is a mere sham to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor."°2 Sham litigation has been defined in
103 and,
various ways by courts subsequent to CaliforniaMotor Transport.,
unfortunately, the attempts to define sham litigation have led to inconsistent
and confusing results. 1"
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify this confusion in Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. 5 The Court enunciated a two-part test for
determining whether a lawsuit constitutes sham litigation and thereby forfeits
Noerr immunity.
First, to fall within the sham exception, a lawsuit must be "objectively
baseless", i.e., not commenced with a reasonable expectation of success on the
merits." Second, the court must focus on the litigant's subjective motivation,
specifically whether the baseless lawsuit is a smoke screen concealing efforts
to interfere directly with a competitor's business relationships. The Court
elaborated:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. If
an objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably
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calculated to elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under
Noerr, and an antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must
fail. Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court
examine the litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part
of our definition of sham, the court should focus on whether the
baseless lawsuit conceals 'an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor,' Noerr through the 'use [of]
the government process-as opposed to the outcome of that
process-as an anticompetitive weapon"'
Unquestionably, ProfessionalReal Estate Investors makes it more difficult for
litigants to meet the prongs of the sham exception.' °8 The reported postProfessionalReal Estate Investors decisions in the intellectual property realm
have generally rejected arguments that the litigation in question were shams
and upheld Noerrimmunity. 9
This is not to say that ProfessionalReal Estate Investors,Inc. has shut the
door on the sham exceptions. The decision in CVD Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,' °
discussed supra, shows how baselessness might be established today in the
context of trade secrets. In that a case, the secrets were clearly in the public
domain and Raytheon had made only a cursory investigation without
thoroughly examining government reports nor the extent of public disclosure.
That evidence would clearly have supported a finding that a reasonable
litigant in Raytheon's shoes would have investigated the extent to which
disclosures were in the public domain prior to threatening litigation.' 1'
Moreover, the fact that the patentee or the holder of a trade secret
successfully obtains a temporary restraining order does not vitiate antitrust
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claims based on knowing enforcement of invalid intellectual property rights.'
Temporary restraining orders are non-firal orders and can be obtained ex
parte and hence are not dispositive."'
c. Noerr and threats of suit
Noerr itself protects the right to sue the government but it does not
address threats to sue. However, it would be anomalous to protect the right
to sue without also protecting threats to sue." 4 Most lawsuits are preceded by
communications between the parties, and these pre-litigation communications
may facilitate settlement of controversies." 5 Therefore, the law protects acts
11 6
which are "reasonably and normally attendant upon effective litigation."
However, just as Noerrprotects legitimate pre-litigation communications
premised on the right to sue the government, the sham exception should apply
when those threats are baseless. 1 7 In UnitedStates v. Besser Manufacturing
Co.," 8 the court concluded that defendant had monopolized the sale of
concrete blocks because, it (1) entered into semi-exclusive licensing
arrangements for key patents with a rival and agreed not to license others; (2)
acquired control of two rivals; and (3) recklessly threatened infringement
suits. With respect to the threats to file an infringement suit, the court stated:
it further appears that there were two or three instances where suit
was threatened involving machines that agents of defendants had
never even seen. The threat of a law suit for infringement should be
bona fide and one asserting the exclusive right granted by the United
9
States should not indiscriminately abuse the right."
The status of communications to customers or suppliers of persons being
sued or threatened with suit is less clear. Areeda and Turner argue that a
112
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pattern of making false or exaggerated claims to the media regarding a
pending lawsuit might not receive Noerr protection.' Furthermore, Areeda
and Turner argue that the Noerr status of publicity or indirect threats aimed
at customers depends on the existence of a non-sham claim against the
customer. 2 ' If the antitrust defendant has no claims against the customers
themselves, then publicity or threats are a direct interference with a rival's
business that are not necessitated by or related to the suit against the rival. 2
On the other hand, where the customer of a rival may face liability as a
contributory infringer, then information about a non-sham suit may be
properly communicated as an indirect threat of suit. 3 Accordingly, the sham
issue must be resolved separately in regard to both rivals and customers.' 24
Thus, to succeed on an antitrust claim premised on a Handgards theory
in light of the holding in ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, a plaintiff must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that infringement suits and threats
of infringement are (1) objectively baseless and (2) merely a disguised attempt
to interfere directly in plaintiffs business relations. In addition, the other
elements of a monopolization or attempted monopolization scheme must be
proven.
2. Specific Intent to Monopolize
The second element of a Handgards-typeclaim is to prove specific intent
to attempt monopolization of the relevant market.'25 Specific intent may be
26
shown either by direct evidence or by evidence of anticompetitive conduct.'
Proof of intent alone, without supporting proof of anticompetitive conduct,
will not sustain an attempted monopolization action.'27 Predatory conduct
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must also be shown.12 Evidence of conduct, thus indispensible, rests on the
fact that direct evidence of intent alone can be ambiguous and misleading.
3. DangerousProbabilityof Success
Pursuant to Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan,'29 it is clear that in order to
establish the offense of attempted monopolization, the plaintiff must prove
both the relevant market and the plaintiff's powers within that market. 130
Relevant factors include defendant's market share, barriers to entry, the
strength and capacity of existing rivals, the nature of the anticompetitive
conduct and the elasticity of demand."'
4. Damages
The plaintiff must prove both the fact of damage, that is, a causal nexus
between the anticompetitive conduct and injury suffered, and the amount of
damages." Any damages that plaintiff suffered must be established with
reasonable certainty.133 However, once the fact of damages has been
established, a more relaxed standard of proof applies to the amount of those
damages."
Proof of damages may be based on "a just and reasonable
estimate based on relevant data" but not on "speculation or guesswork".' 35
Where a seller is excluded from the market, lost profits are generally the
measure of damages. 36 However, where the plaintiff has never actually
entered a market, it is open to allegations that its damages are speculative.
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B. Overall Scheme to Monopolize
A second prong of antitrust liability may be premised on the defendant's
use and threatened use of the court system to enforce invalid claims as part of
an overall scheme to violate the antitrust laws. The leading case on this theory
is Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.' Kobe was an action by a patentee
claiming infringement of five patents relating to hydraulic oil pumps. The
defendant, Dempsey, interposed an antitrust counterclaim, alleging that the
infringement action was part and parcel of a monopolistic scheme. 38 The
Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding of antitrust liability based on the
following record.'39
1. Kobe and its rival, Rodless, formed a patent pool. Every patent
related to hydraulic oil pumps, even if it was never used became part of the
pool. Kobe was the only one who manufactured hydraulic pumps until
Dempsey placed one on the market." 4
2. The Dempsey pump, when shown at a trade show, generated much
interest among customers, including Kobe customers. Memos from Kobe
sales personnel indicated that the Dempsey pump, which was selling for less
and outperforming the Kobe product, was a competitive threat.' 4'
3. Before Kobe had even received drawings of the Dempsey pump, it
served written notice of infringement and demanded that Dempsey discontinue
its manufacturing and sales."
4. After the suit against Dempsey had been commenced, Kobe sent a
letter to the purchasing agents of forty major buyers of hydraulic pumping
equipment notifying them of Kobe's infringement suit against Dempsey. As
a result of the suit and the letters, Dempsey's business substantially slowed to
a near standstill. 43 The notices were thinly veiled threats that purchasers of
Dempsey equipment might be involved in the suit and were infomred that
litigation may last for two years.'" Kobe's president expressed his view that
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it was impossible to manufacture a hydraulic pump without infringing the
45
Kobe patent.
5. Kobe widely publicized to the number of patents which it oned. Its
patent listing was placed conspicuously in its catalogs and included some
patents that had already expired."4
6. Four of the five patents which Kobe had sued on were found invalid.
One was found valid and infringed. Nevertheless, antitrust liability against
Kobe was upheld. The real purpose of the actions against Dempsey was not
47
to protect patents but to maintain its monopolistic control of the field.'
The Court in Kobe concluded:
The result of Kobe's infringement action, its verbal and written
statements to the trade, was disastrous to the defendants. There was
almost a complete boycott of their products. To hold that there was
no liability for damages caused by this conduct, through lawful in
itself, would permit a monopolizer to smother every potential
competitor with litigation before it had an opportunity to be otherwise
48
caught in its tentacles and leave the competitor without a remedy.'
The fact that Kobe's acts may have been lawful is not exculpatory. The
American Tobacco court stated, "It is not the form of the combination or the
particular means used but the result to be achieved that the statute
condemns."' 4 9 Lawful acts which are relied upon to effectuate a conspiracy
are within the scope of the Sherman Act. 5 Even a good faith prosecution of
a valid patent, when it is shown that the infringement suit "was brought in
furtherance and as an integral part of a plan to violate the antitrust laws" may
5
result in antitrust liability.1 '
In addition, under Kobe, plaintiffs must establish more than a series of
baseless infringement actions to prove the existence of an overall
monopolization scheme:
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In overall scheme cases such as Kobe, courts require proof of an
overall scheme to monopolize independent of the mere commencement of an infringement suit before permitting the imposition of
antitrust liability based on patent enforcement conduct. This
requirement diminishes the specter of antitrust liability encountered
by an ordinary patentee who brings an infringement action.'
For example, use of bogus lawsuits or threats of lawsuits to further an
unlawfully restrictive licensing policy might furnish evidence of a scheme to
annihilate competition. Courts have not hesitated to strike down licensing
schemes used to control competition.' 53 As the court in A&E PlasticPak Co.
observed:
The critical question in an antitrust context is whether the restriction
may fairly be said to be ancillary to a commercially supportable
licensing arrangement, or whether the licensing scheme is a sham set
up for the purpose of controlling competition while avoiding the
consequences of the antitrust laws.' 54
This is especially true where one does not have restrictions ancillary to a
lawful license but instead has an unlawful arrangement with ancillary
licensing. In addition, courts have held that a horizontal conspiracy to commit
a business tort violates section one of the Sherman Act.'55 Recent cases favor
a rule of reasonableness in this area.'56
Prosecution under a Kobe theory is a more ambitious undertaking than
either a Handgards or Walker Process theory where invalidity is the key
component of the action. Under Kobe, however, the plaintiff is permitted to
argue that even successful patent infringement prosecutions are evidence of
an antitrust violation. Hence, under Kobe, proof of invalidity, which would
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in many cases require expensive and time-consuming expert testimony, is not
essential. As under Handgards and Walker Process, plaintiffs under Kobe
have also found success to be elusive.
CONCLUSION
Attempts to enforce fraudulently obtained or invalid intellectual property
rights may give rise to antitrust liability. However, pursuit of these liability
theories is not for the faint-hearted. The costs and complexity of these types
of antitrust cases are daunting, and plaintiffs have only met with limited
success. Nevertheless, the potential financial rewards will continue to serve
as an incentive for the victims of fraud or bad faith lawsuits to prosecute
claims under Walker Process or Handgards.

